Introduction
In an era of nationalism, settlers and colonization serve as instruments of territorial expansion and control over contested territories. Colonization has been combined with ethnic cleansing of indigenous populations driven by beliefs that such demographic engineering will consolidate new irreversible 'facts' on the ground (Lustick, 1993; McGarry & O'Leary, 1993:10) . Settlers are generally seen as accomplices to violations of international law and, therefore, are subject to little international sympathy or interest by social scientists who study vulnerable groups such as threatened minorities, displaced persons and refugees. Yet conflict processes often transform settler populations from alleged beneficiaries of colonization to potential victims of discrimination and violence (Laitin, 1998: ix; Pergher, 2009 ). More importantly, the presence of settlers is a crucial aspect of many conflicts, in some cases complicating peacemaking, and in others making conflict resolution impossible. For this reason, societies built on a settler/indigenous divide tend to be inherently unstable; indigenous resistance aims to reverse colonization before settlers establish facts on the ground while colonization frequently takes on a life of its own as settlers simultaneously confront indigenous resistance and attempts in their 'home' state for a peaceful withdrawal of their settlements (Lustick, 1985 (Lustick, & 1993 Haklai, 2007) .
However, as this article argues, despite the huge problems colonization creates for a contested territory, settlers should not always be seen exclusively as a cause of controversy and conflict. The article argues that resolving conflict requires a complex diagnosis of the conflict's sources including an analysis of the language, as well as framing, and differentiation of settlers from those in overlapping categories, such as refugees or legal and illegal migrants (Navaro-Yashin, 2006; Lakoff, 2001: 187-189; Laitin, 1998: 265-268) . Drawing on Ian Lustick's seminal work (1985, 1988, 1993) , the article situates the experience of Turkish settlers in Cyprus within the general theoretical framework of settlers in contested territories. It examines how this framework relates to conflict resolution in the island, investigating in particular whether colonization has reached the point of 'no return', thereby ensuring the irreversible partition of Cyprus. It argues that this point has not yet been reached. Resolving the Cyprus problem is still possible, however a peace settlement will require a number of innovative arrangements, including asymmetrical citizenship, various compensation schemes and other mutually beneficial 'win-win' arrangements. The article presents the legal and humanitarian dimensions of the problem, the native discourses accompanying rapid demographic change and notes how the mobilization and politicization dynamics within the settler community in Cyprus affect the prospects for a settlement.
The settler issue in Cyprus presents an intriguing contrast between legal approaches to ethnic conflict resolution and sociological approaches focusing on migrants and immigration. On the one hand, colonization of occupied territories is a violation of international law. The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, of which Turkey is a signatory, explicitly stipulates that 'the occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies' (UNHCR, 1997).
1 The logic behind this clause is the protection of indigenous peoples against the will of more 1 Turkey has opposed settlers and colonization on other occasions. For example, the Turkish government opened its Ottoman land registry archives for the first time in 2009 to help Palestinian lawyers prove that title deeds produced by settlers in East Jerusalem were indeed forged (Cook, 2009 ).
powerful nations who aim to create facts on the ground through expulsion and demographic engineering. In sociological terms, on the other hand, the settlers in Cyprus and potentially elsewhere could also be considered an immigrant population interested primarily in their personal and family advancement and much less concerned with confrontational politics of the core state. Kymlicka (1995) contested territory has problematic ideological underpinnings about rights of 'others' in that territory (Pedersen, 2005) . Moreover, migrating in a contested territory where the potential of violence exists requires a commitment to core state nationalism strong enough to outweigh any personal risks this commitment might entail. Immigrants tend to avoid such risks, and as Laitin (2009:39) argues, they have a relatively cheap alternative to war: namely, exit to their own home country or a third place. Immigrants also tend to be urban and have skills that are transferable elsewhere in contrast to less mobile settler populations that are tied to homes and land claimed by former inhabitants. Core state disengagement and potential relocation could be more costly for them than for immigrants. Finally, settlers and migrants are viewed differently by the international community and indigenous populations, often creating self-fulfilling cycles of confrontation. As Freeman (1995) argues, criticizing progressive policies on immigration can lead to 'abusive' charges of racism in liberal democracies, while political programs aiming at the complete withdrawal of settlers and settlements can be validated through reference to international law and indigenous peoples' rights (UNHCR, 1997; Andreason, 2009) In fact, the international community is itself divided on settler issues, often failing to resolve its internal tensions between legal principles, human rights and pragmatism.
One school of thought advocates the centrality of justice and international law mechanisms and argues for the application of widely acknowledged standards of law documented in the resolutions of international organizations such as the UN and the European Court of Human Rights (Leckie, 2003: 12 (Leckie, 2003: 12) . 3 Other decisions by the same court imply that apart from restituting properties, compensations might become acceptable options in the future (ECHR, 2003) .
human rights of non-indigenous groups, such as settlers and their descendants (Carens, 2000: 217) . A key concern is the passage of time, notably, constraints in applying international legal principles and penalizing individuals for crimes committed decades earlier by their home states.
Balancing conflicting principles is often extremely difficult for mediators and international organizations as they could be easily be charged with tolerating ethnic cleansing or demonstrating racism and discrimination against a potentially vulnerable population. Even using the term settler to describe a particular population can be contested depending on the political context; in some cases, it has been eliminated from public discourse (Andreason, 2009). 4 As a result, international institutions have dealt with settler issues in seemingly contradictory ways. In the Baltic Republics, the European Union has encouraged the naturalization of Russian settlers and implicitly made the amendment of citizenship laws a pre-condition for EU membership (Ozolins, 1999: 39) .
At the same time, the EU (at least formally) prohibits trade with the Jewish settlements in the West Bank, while the European Parliament delayed in 1995 the EU-funded Panam Project in Tibet, with the rationale that the 'scheme aimed at feeding new Chinese settlers against the interest of the Tibetan people' (European Parliament, 1995) . Likewise, Kymlicka (2007:383) 
The Conflict in Cyprus
Cyprus became independent from British rule in 1960 but power-sharing arrangements between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots lasted only for three years. Following the 1963-64 bicommunal clashes, Turkish Cypriots were forced to settle in enclaves and to abandon their share in the government (Fisher, 2001: 310; Patrick, 1976 Attalides, 1979; Kliot & Mansfeld, 1994; Necatigil, 1989) . 5 Turkish and Greek Cypriots developed uneven responses to their refugee experience; generally speaking, Turkish Cypriots aimed to consolidate their presence in the north, while Greek Cypriots retained a strong desire to maintain rights of return to their ancestral villages and towns in the north (Hadjipavlou, 2007; Loizos, 1981; Zetter, 1994 Zetter, , 1999 Kliot & Mansfeld, 1994) . settlers whose 'non-Cypriot' parents were born in the island). 7 Overall, these numbers have been used as a tool by politicians on both sides of the divide to foster their agendas, with head-counts serving as ammunition in public debates (Tezgor, 2003) . issues -but not on settlers (Lordos, 2006:14; Lordos, Kaymak, & Tocci, 2009 ). Official
Greek Cypriot discourses describe the presence of settlers as a violation of international law and the Geneva Convention (Loucaides, 1995; Chrysostomides, 2000: 197-215 ), a view documented by frequent references to the reports of the Council of Europe (Cuco, 1994) . In the official Greek Cypriot narrative, the presence of settlers is viewed as a threat to peaceful relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the demographic structure of the country. 8 According to former Minister of Justice of the Republic, Kypros Chrysostomides, the 'settlers from the Turkish mainland have no rights to the land that they occupy and their settlement in Cyprus was a flagrant violation of international law. Any vacillation by the international community on this point would be taken as setting a most unfortunate precedent ' (2000:434) .
Yet uncompromising discourses on settlers have not assumed a dominant hegemonic position in Greek Cypriot politics. For instance, in the 2008-9 negotiations, the Greek Cypriot side offered to accept 50,000 settlers as Cypriot citizens, the largest number ever in bilateral negotiations (Hughes, 2008 (Aggelides, 2007:21; Matsis, 2009) .
Debating the settler issue in the Cyprus parliament, MPs have asked the government to make the withdrawal of settlers a precondition for Turkey's EU accession negotiations (Syllouris, 2005:22) , citing the withdrawal of Israeli settlers and occupying troops from Gaza and parts of the West Bank as evidence of the efficacy of international law (Cleanthous, 2005: 46) . Greek Cypriots moderates, meanwhile, have argued that
showing flexibility on humanitarian grounds will make the Greek Cypriot side more credible in the eyes of the international community (Stephanou, 2009 Turkish Cypriots will return as partners to the south. This will lead to a further major retrenchment of Cypriot Hellenism' (Anastasiades, 2007:6) .
The Turkish Cypriot community is similarly divided on the settler issue. policies of the Denktaş administration and according to estimates, 44 per cent of the inhabitants of predominantly settler villages voted for reunification (Hatay, 2005:46) . 
Politicization and Settlers
However, unlike settler cases elsewhere, those actions seem disconnected from the island's settler grassroots. As a matter of fact, during past decades, no major episodes implicated settlers directly with incidents of political violence, and efforts to politicize settlers during elections have been short-lived and unsuccessful. Although settlers constitute a significant part of the electorate, in the previous (as well as current) Turkish
Cypriot assemblies, only two members among 50 were natives of Turkey. In the comparable cases of Israeli settlers (West Bank and Gaza), French settlers (Algeria) and Ulster Protestant settlers (Northern Ireland), there was overwhelming political activity and mobilization among settler populations seeking territorial disengagement from the core state (Lustick, 1993) . Settler mobilization has prevented a two-state solution in
Israel/Palestine, led to the partition of Ireland and forced massive war crimes in Algeria before French disengagement.
In Cyprus, low levels of politicization are generally attributed to the largely heterogeneous character of the settler population. In an interview, a settler politician argued that settlers differ not only in terms of ethnic and regional background (e.g.
Kurds, Laz and Arab speakers) but also in terms of time and conditions of arrival in
Cyprus, degree of assimilation and political affiliation. 12 The several peace plans in Cyprus have also weakened the settlers' position with respect to Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot authorities and divided the community between long-term residents who will stay after the settlement and the rest. On this issue, for instance, Dr. Çevikel broke the alliance with CTP when the latter decided to exclude him from the naturalization lists given to the UN during the negotiations. Even so, his association has remained defunct since then and subsequent attempts to mobilize settler vote have been unsuccessful.
Low politicization also stems from the nature of the original settlers. According to Lacher and Kaymak, war veterans and martyrs' families were given land and houses in northern Cyprus after 1974 Cyprus after (2005 . However, the overwhelming majority of settlers 12 Taken from author's fieldwork notes.
opted to abandon their villages in Anatolia for economic reasons and not to serve ideological purposes (although ideology and nationalism might have played a significant role in some cases). Class and status is probably the most important factor in the lack of mobilization. In most other cases of settler colonialism, settlers were economically privileged, and repatriation to the home state meant the loss of status and relative ease of life. For instance, the pied-noirs in Algeria, although largely heterogeneous in composition, effectively transformed the local Muslim population into serfs (Lustick, 2005 ). Yet in personal terms, settlers in Cyprus will gain significantly after a settlement.
They tend, therefore, to be less committed to the ideological tenets of Turkish nationalism for instrumental reasons or simply because they lack the resources for mobilization. Yashin, 2006 ). Yet for the time being, the situation is manageable, and interests tend to 13 Taken from author's fieldwork notes.
sustain low levels of politicization and mobilization in Cyprus, suggesting the potential for a creative institutional design of community group rights.
Annan Plan and Alternatives
Previous plans proposed by the UN for Cyprus are particularly relevant in debating the way the international community understands settler issues. As mentioned above, UN mediators were confronted with a major discrepancy concerning the actual number of the settlers; the Greek Cypriot side suggested a figure of 119,000, while Turkish Cypriots claimed that the number was around 60,000 (UN, 2004b:15; UN 2003:22) . In response, the UN suggested naturalizing 45,000 people, as well as everyone married to a Turkish Cypriot, and maintaining another 5 per cent of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state population as immigrants (UN, 2004a: 8-9; UN, 2004b:15) . If the Greek Cypriot numbers were correct, the remaining settlers would have to leave Cyprus within five years of receiving a small compensation package of no less than 10,000 Euro for a household of four (UN, 2004a: 77) .
For the Greek Cypriots, the plan was ambiguous as to the exact numbers of the settlers to remain in Cyprus; these could easily vary from a low of 45,000, to a high which included all established settlers in the island (around 90,000). For example, the number of settlers married to Turkish Cypriots was unavailable. Additionally, the status of the relatives of the 45,000 settlers to be naturalized in order of priority was unclear.
And would the Turkish Cypriot side opt to exhaust its immigration quotas of around 15, 000 people immediately to serve settler needs? It was also unclear whether universities in northern Cyprus would offer cover for illegal immigrants (as some schools in the South), Several critiques in the literature suggest how difficult it is to legitimize powersharing in divided societies and justify consociational arrangements in democratic terms (Horowitz, 1985) . The challenge in Cyprus is not simply to accept settlers as part of the demos but to accommodate natives and settlers in complex consociational arrangements with the concomitant danger of giving primacy to settler rights over native ones. There are however alternative arrangements that could minimize some of these challenges while maintaining the consociational logic of the settlement. Expanding the options on issues of citizenship and the negotiations in general often requires reconfiguring linkages among issues. This can be done by de-linking issues assumed to be interconnected in an attempt to decouple a complex problem into smaller components, or by drawing win-win linkages and tying together issues that are not apparently related in any functional sense (Raiffa, 1982; Lohmann, 1997; Lustick, 1993 Timing naturalization could be a related option. Settlers could be naturalized with time and their descendants receive citizenship at birth, as suggested for similar situations by Carens (2000) . For the Greek Cypriots, the gradual naturalization of settlers is a better alternative than the immediate and unconditional naturalization of settlers proposed in Annan V, particularly if these naturalizations are tied to other concessions for Greek
Cypriots. The contribution of settlers to the peace process will help Greek Cypriots see them in a more positive light, building a more sustainable relationship in the long term.
Moreover, this approach gives more flexibility, allowing Turkish Cypriots to integrate settlers more gradually. In short, collective contribution to peace, integration into the Turkish Cypriot culture and the passage of time could be alternative paths leading to
naturalization.
An alternative arrangement in managing settler conflicts involves linkage strategies for issues of major concern for natives, such as territory and refugee rights. In Cyprus, mediators have entertained the author's previously suggested idea of preparing a flexible map across the federal border with final territorial re-adjustment to be determined on the basis of population movements among refugees and possibly settlers. 15 The more settlers Greek Cypriots accept, the more land they will receive in the final adjustment of the border (see also Economist, 2008; Lordos, Kaymak, & Tocci, 2009) . Likewise, for the Turkish Cypriot side (and Turkey) the more refugees actually return, the more land they will receive after readjustment. For instance, if 25,000 refugees actually return, the Turkish Cypriot federal territory would be delimited to 25 per cent, while if 100,000 choose to return, the territory would be readjusted to 30 per cent. All other scenarios fall into a middle ground.
Moreover, to maximize territorial concessions to each community, reserved lands could incentivize support among settlers, Turkish Cypriots and especially Greek refugees, if family houses with emotional value, holy places and schools are included in reserves designed specifically to attract Greek Cypriot returnees. On this point, Kymlicka emphasizes the critical importance of reserves and argues that history has shown that the most effective way to protect indigenous communities is to establish reserve territories where land cannot be alienated without the consent of the community as whole (Kymlicka, 1995:43) . issue. This formula combines a minimum number of Greek Cypriot returns to the Turkish zone with self-adjustable linkages and incentives for the Turkish Cypriot side to accept the rest. The approach has several advantages over previous UN-mediated provisions on refugee return. Greek Cypriots concessions, previously envisioned to secure a maximum refugee threshold, would not have to be made until refugees actually return. Turkish
Cypriots (and Turkey) will be guaranteed majority status under all demographic scenarios even if all Greek Cypriots decide to return. Finally, refugee return will be perceived as less 'threatening' by the recipient communities and the settlers, thus contributing to a more secure return process for the refugees. These arrangements maintain the balance of the settlement and reduce demographic uncertainty with regards to settlers (for Greek Cypriots) and refugees (for Turkish Cypriots, settlers and Turkey).
A final possible arrangement concerns the granting of various forms of compensation to settlers willing to repatriate to Turkey. It is important to note that compensation schemes might often have unintended consequences or simply fail to work.
In his seminal work on the security dilemma, Robert Jervis comments on unintended effects while debating the Rhodesian 'safety net' -guaranteeing compensations for whites leaving the country (1978: 174) . The experience of international organizations in Bosnia and elsewhere suggest that trial and error strategies might be needed until the most optimal outcomes are reached (Dahlman & Ó Tuathail 2005) .
Specifically, in the case of Bosnia, European governments offered refugees the 'right to regret', an option potentially applicable to Cyprus as well. Bosnian returnees living temporarily in the UK and France were given the option to return with the same status if their experience with repatriation to Bosnia proved negative (Black, 2001: 186-87 
Conclusions
While colonization is a violation of international law and norms, so too is the massive and indiscriminate expulsion of settlers with their families, especially after the passage of decades. Carens describes just such a dilemma in the French colony of New Caledonia where the French government encouraged immigration, deliberately manipulating the principles of equal citizenship and majority rule to retain its hegemony over the island (Carens, 2000: 17 and emotional appeal to the homeland (Lustick, 1985: 8 (Lustick, 1993) . Turkey might follow a similar trajectory if settlers assume a dominant position in Cyprus consolidating the irreversible partition of the island and possibly the permanent exclusion of Turkey from European integration.
